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How Davids Can Beat Goliaths: The
Winning Strategy of the Mono Lake
Committee in Historical Perspective
Jessica Simanton
"Rogue Valley Growers Butt Heads with Environmentalists in Klamath Water Dispute." This could be
a headline for the battle currently fought by environmentalists focused on saving the wildlife, specifically
the salmon, that depend on Oregon's Klamath River for
survival. Klamath'.s water however, is also vital to the
agricultural ventures of the Oregon community to its
south.
In Southern California, as in Rogue Valley, water is
precious. Much of the region is desert. Insufficient
fresh water has been California's problem since the
beginning of its modern history. The Los Angeles
Department of Water and Power (LADWP) has taken
the lead in acquiring this vital resource. At the heart of
LADWP's 20 th century water projects was its diversion
of Mono Lake water, which began in the 1940s. At the
height of the project in the 1970s, Los Angeles was
getting 17 percent of its water from Mono Lake. While
the lake's water kept Los Angeles booming, the lake
itself, a once thriving ecosystem, was quickly diminishing. The destruction to the lake's environment caught
the attention of environmentalists who, after a long
battle, changed water rights and environmental fights
forever, providing an important model for subsequent
environmental activists.
The LADWP's original 1931 plan to divert water
from Mono Lake failed to weigh the environmental
effects the project might have on the area's ecosys-
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terns. The subsequent destruction of Mono Lake was
similar to the environmental outcome of many of the
state's other water projects; however, the Mono Lake
Committee's fight against the LAD WP set an important
precedent for future environmental battles against
human sprawl and development. The two best works
on the significance of the battle over Mono Lake are
John Hart's Storm Over Mono (1985) which details
every aspect of the water conflict; and Craig Arnold's
Working Out an Environmental Ethic: Lessons From
Mono Lake (2004) a lecture discussing the strategy of

the Mono Lake Committee (MLC), and emphasizing
that it did not simply rely on environmental law to win.
This paper will expand on both Hart's and Arnold's
emphases, and place the Mono Lake story and the
MLC's success in historical perspective. It will discuss
how the strategy used by environmentalists was
different than that used in previous environmental
battles and will reveal why the MLC's strategy was
ultimately successful, and made a lasting mark in the
history of environmental protection efforts.
There are countless examples of environmentalists
failing to protect or save natural ecosystems from the
forces of human development. Both Hetch Hetchy and
Mono Lake are in the bounds of Yosemite National
Park. Both are incredibly appealing aesthetically, and
environmental groups seeking to protect them were
forced to take on extremely powerful water development groups. Hetch Hetchy is representative of environmental battles before the Mono Lake conflict.
Drawing water from Mono Lake had been an option
for LADWP's projects since the 1920s. At that time Los
Angeles had been focusing most of its energy on the
hugely successful diversion project in Owens Valley, a
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community just south of Mono Lake. 64 Despite that
venture's success, William Mullholland, Joseph B.
Lippencott, and Fred Eaton, the big names of Los
Angeles 's water projects, knew that Owens could not
provide enough water forever. 6 5 Mono Lake was a
great candidate as a Los Angeles water source because
of its size and feeder stream flow pattern. Additionally
Mono Lake's water would be relatively cheap to transport to Los Angeles and would be profitable once it
arrived. 66 Potential became reality in 1929 when the
LADWP began acquiring right-of-way land (land
immediately around or effected by the lake or its
streams) and water rights in the greater Mono Lake
area. In 1931 LADWP's thirty eight million dollar
project was approved by the State Water Rights Board
and State Water Resources Control Board. Los Angeles
was granted a permit to divert almost the complete
flow of the five streams that supply water into Mono
Lake. 67 With the project established, and some minor
disputes with Mono County landowners resolved, Los
Angeles was ready to proceed. In 1941 , with their
diversion tunnel complete, water from Mono Lake
began to flow to Los Angeles.
Nearly thirty years later, after Los Angeles had
added a second diversion tunnel to the Mono Exten64

Mono Lake Committee, Mono Lake: Paradise in Peril,
(Oa kland, Fall 1979), 12.
65
John Hart, Stonn Over Mono (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1996) , 37 .
66
Ibid.
67
Craig Arnold, "Working Out an Environmental Ethic:
Anniversa ry Lessons From Mono Lake" (lecture given at
University of Wyoming College of Law, Fall 2003), in Wyoming
Law Review 4 (Winter 2004): 13.
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sion, Mono Lake was experiencing a more rapid decline
water level than ever. 68 At this point Mono Lake came
to the attention of the two environmentalists who
eventually put into motion the "Save Mono Lake" fight.
UC Berkeley student Tim Such first became interested
in Mono Lake when he was seeking a subject for a
research project. While researching the lake, Such
became engrossed in its demise. In late 197 4 Such
attempted to gain support of established environmental groups to halt the slow death of Mono Lake. He was
turned down because "they thought the Mono issue
was far too complex ... [and that) you couldn't fight Los
Angeles" without a good legal theory. 69 Such took their
advice and began to focus his research on the legal
arguments and precedents that might help save the
lake. After much hard work Such temporarily called it
quits on his Mono Lake campaign to focus on attaining
his masters degree, but was later brought back into
the campaign by David Gaines, a Stanford graduate,
biologist, ornithologist, and ecologist, as well as a bird
enthusiast, and professor at UC Davis. 70 Gaines, who
had also researched the lake's demise, left his job to
focus on Mono Lake. In 1976 he brought together a
small group of environmentalists and students to do
extensive research on the different ecosystems and
wildlife that were being disrupted due to the d iversion.
The MLC formed in 1978. David Gaines and wife
Sally Judy, along with the small group of environmentalists set up headquarters in Lee Vining, a town near
68

Mono La ke Committee (MLC), Mono Lake: Endangered

Oasis (Berkeley, 1993), 30.
69
Hart, Storm Over Mono, 63.
70

Arnold , "Working Out an Environmental Ethic," 14.
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the lake, and began their grassroots effort by selling tshirts and distributing "Save Mono Lake" bumper
stickers throughout California. 71 Gaines began speaking to environmental groups. Gaines' captivating
speeches brought Friends of the Earth to the cause.
After great debate the influential law firm Morrison
and Foerster took the case pro bona, persuaded by
California Audubon Society's George Peyton, the birdfriendly National Audubon Society, and Such's legal
research .72
The MLC's mission: save Mono Lake. This mission
was so simple and broad that it was supported by all
the diverse individual members and groups that joined
hands with the MLC. While there were many different
goals involved in the Mono Lake campaign, all were
united by the fact that for each individual goal to be
realized, the lake needed to be healthy. 73 This uniting
factor was key because it was able to bring together
groups of environmentalists, who, under other circumstances, could have clashed on many different levels;
however, because they all needed the lake, they
focused their efforts on this common goal.
Environmentalists in the early 20 th century fight to
save Hetch-Hetchy also pulled together a group from
environmental and other establishments to oppose a
major city, in their case San Francisco. However, this
group was not united like the MLC. The Sierra Club,
which led the Hetch-Hetchy opposition, was headed by
John Muir, a mulish environmentalist who often
butted heads with his colleagues, causing rifts within
71
72

73

Ibid., 15.
Hart, Storm Over Mono, 81 -83 .
Ibid., 114-116.
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the group that need~d to be united in order to have
even the smallest chance of beating San Francisco. 74
Just after the MLC, Friends of the Earth, and the
National Audubon Society sued the LADWP in 1978, a
memberofGovernorJenyBrown's administration, the
conservationist Henry Johnson, called a summit to
create an interagency taskforce. The taskforce was lead
by the Water Resources Board, but included other
government agencies: Fish and Game, The Forest
Service, Bureau of Land Management, US Fish and
Wildlife Service, County of Mono, the nonvoting Inyo
County, and of course the LADWP. The taskforce's
mission was "to develop and recommend a plan of
action to preserve and protect the natural resources in
Mono Basin, considering economic and social factors."
First on the agenda was finding a replacement for
Mono water. 75 By May 1979 the focus had shifted. The
taskforce called, not for water replacement, but for Los
Angeles to cut water diversion to 15,000 acre feet per
year so Mono Lake could maintain a water elevation
level of 6,388 feet (higher than that for which the MLC
had originally asked). These cuts were to be made
through conservation and waste water reclamation.
Electric power production would be cut; however, the
taskforce concluded that if hot water usage was
limited, electric power drops would not have much of
a lasting effect. The upshot for Los Angeles would be
that two-thirds of the conservation project would be
paid for by state and federal government, along with
seven-eighths of the water reclamation costs, and Los
74

Richard Righter, The Battle Over Hetch Hetchy (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2005), 92-93.
75
Hart, Storm Over Mono, 85.
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Angeles would be able to divert additional water in a
drought situation. 76
This recommendation provided a boost for the MLC
because it showed that the government (at least a
number of agencies within the government) backed the
MLC's concerns about the resources associated with
the lake. Even though the taskforce's recommendation
did not have much of an effect until the end of the
1980s, this victory provided a psychological lift to the
MLC. 77 This type of boost was one that the environmentalists of the Hetch Hetchy battle seldom experienced.
While the taskforce's recommendation certainly
helped the MLC, it was not the make-or-break factor in
MLC's fight. It was the strategy created by the MLC
that gave it small victories like the taskforce recommendation. The MLC's strategy can be broken down
into its four most important components. Each component, and more importantly the MLC's execution of
each component, was key to the overall success of the
group's original mission.
The first of these components: effectively bringing
together and utilizing a large and diverse support
system. The MLC started small, but soon its members
numbered in the thousands. Additionally, groups like
the National Audubon Society and Friends of the
Earth, along with small specific interest groups like
the California Trout and Mammoth Fly Rodders, and
even larger public communities across California
became vital additions to the MLC's base group. The
MLC did not turn away support that came its way, and
76
77

Ibid., 85, 88.
Ibid.
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even when things could have gotten potentially tense
between groups with conflicting concerns, the MLC
was able to deal with each in such a way that it united
them instead of leaving them to focus solely on their
own priorities.78 Each of these groups was able to play
a role that had a favorable impact on the Mono Lake
fight. 79 This is key because it kept groups interested in,
and often more focused on, the primary cause.
In the case of Hetch Hetchy, there was a generally
large group of supporters; however, due to disparate
goals, as the conflict grew more and more complicated,
the opposition to San Francisco could not be mounted
effectively. Arguments were often at cross purposes
and chaotic. Environmentalists fighting other environmentalists caused their arguments to look a lot less
impressive.
The second component of the MLC's winning
strategy was extensive research. Before the MLC eve_n
formed there was an abundance of research about the
effects of water diversion on various ecosystems within
the Mono Basin, and as time went on that research
doubled, then tripled. With so much reliable scientific
information available on the effects of diversion on the
lake and the lake's ecosystem it was impossible to
claim there were no problems due to diversion. Even
Los Angeles could not deny this. 80 People had access to
the information, and it was used in courts, speeches to
the public, presentations to politicians, and it filled the
MLC's newsletters and reports. Knowledge is power,
78
79

80

Ibid., 114-116.
MLC, Endangered Oasis, 12.
Hart, Sto rm Over Mono, 102-4.
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and there was no denying the power of the information
concerning Mono Lake.
Research in the Hetch Hetchy conflict was not as
extensive. This may have been because those involved
in both sides of the conflict knew that damming the
valley was going to destroy its ecosystem, so publishing scientific research about the destruction was not
likely to be influential.81 There was instead more of a
focus on publishing emotional letters, essays, and
poetry about the natural wonders and beauty ofHetch
Hetchy than there was information that could be used
as evidence in court. Because there was not research
to support their every argument, the Hetch-Hetchy
environmentalists had holes in their presentation. San
Francisco had an easy time filling in those holes with
their own information, and did so using information to
bolster its case that Hetch Hetchy was vital to the
city's future. 8 2
A third component of the strategy was public
relations. The public trust doctrine which states that
the public at large owns resources and scenic areas,
was the focus of tlie MLC'S battle. David Gaines
wanted to "make people throughout California realize
what would be lost" in the event that the lake continued at its current rate of demise. He wanted them to
understand what they were losing by getting cheap
water to Los Angeles. If it was water they wanted,
Gaines said he would accept their choice, "but it had
to be a knowing choice."83 Thus the MLC worked
81
82
83

Righter, The Battle Over Hetch Hetchy, 98 .
Ibid., passim.
Hart, Storm Over Mono, 184.
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enthusiastically to bring Mono Lake into the lives of
the public at large.
It seemed that the MLC did just about everything
possible to bring the Mono Lake issue into public
awareness. According to the Los Angeles Times, "they
cajole magazines into running articles on the lake, lead
tours and sell Mono Lake coffee mugs and T-shirts,"
but these things barely skim the surface of the MLC
promotional activities. 8 4 Thanks to Mono Lake's scenic
appeal, the MLC did not have to work to bring publicity (in the form oflive news, journalism, and photography) to the lake. The MLC did, however, bring to Mono
Basin low-income community members from the Los
Angeles area, as well as members of organizations, and
students from schools all over Southern California.
Also, with an opponent like the flashy LADWP, the
crisis was easily kept in the spotlight. Additionally,
there was the Mono Lake Newsletter, a quarterly
publication which took the extensive amounts of
ongoing scientific research on the lake's ecosystems
and made it public-friendly. 85 David Gaines traveled
throughout California, and especially to Los Angeles,
giving lectures on Mono Lake and its current crisis.
There were birdathons hosted by the Audubon society,
as well as bikeathons. These were forms offundraising
as well as opportunities to bring people and publicity
to the lake. Other public outreach included state-wide
fundraisers such as luxury bus tours of the Mono
Basin, wine drawings, dinners at high-end restau84

Kevin Roderick, "Selling a Lake" Los Angeles Times, 24
Sep. 1989: 13, microfilm edition.
85
Hart, Stomi Over Mono, 80 .
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rants, yacht rides, and much more. 86 The public was
involved, and in ways that gave them personal attachment to the lake. People could make their own decisions about what they learned from participating in
fun and creative activities, and reading the various
user-friendly publications. In the end, the public gave
a lot of backing to the public trust idea, and also to the
idea that Mono Lake must be preserved. This helped to
show the courts and politicians that the LAD WP had in
fact not followed public trust protocol when they
enacted their Mono Extension project.
The fourth and final major component, and perhaps the component that really saved Mono Lake, was
the philosophy of compromise. From the start the MLC
asked for the minimum water elevation level to keep
the lake's ecosystem thriving. They were never asking
for a complete shutoff of Mono water to Los Angeles,
and as time went on, and especially after Mary Davis
took over leadership of the MLC, the notion of compromise became an even bigger component in the organization's success. Davis did not like the idea of any group
involved in a conflict feeling like it had lost, and she
sure the MLC was amenable to compromise. Without
this willingness to negotiate, LADWP could have held
off for a lot longer, and made the process a lot harder
on the MLC and the lake itself. 87
Muir was not a Davis. He wanted one thing and
there was no compromise. He had little appreciation
for those who did not see the spiritual appeal of
nature, and this made it very hard for him to work
with those he opposed. Muir went to his deathbed
86

Ibid., 89-90 .

87

Ha rt, Storm Over Mono; 176 .
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firmly opposed to the Hetch Hetchy project. Not being
able to negotiate with the opposition put the environm entalists in a deadlock. Powerful institutions had the
money to stall, and San Francisco most certainly held
off and beat the environmentalists using this tactic .
Mono Lake, after much debate, was officially
"saved" in the 1990s. Headed by Davis, the MtC and
the LADWP worked out a plan that allowed Los Angeles to continue diversion, while maintaining a
healthy flow for the lake's survival. The battle had been
long, yet in 1994, it was safe to say it was well worth
the extra time necessary to create such an unbeatable
strategy.
The current struggle to keep Oregon's Klamath
River suitable for the wildlife that depend on it is
taking on a shape similar to the Mono Lake fight. First,
there has been extensive research about the effects of
water diversion on the salmon populations. Additionally, the environmentalists point out a regulation
much like the public trust doctrine that the U.S.
Bureau of Reclamation failed to follow when starting
up their diversion project. In violation of the federal
Endangered Species Act the bureau failed to consult
with other federal agencies about the impact of water
diversion on threatened fish species. 88 The endangered
area is also receiving publicity thanks to President
George W. Bush's efforts to assist the U.S. Bureau of
Reclamation. Finally, environmentalists are not asking
for a complete shutoff of water going to Rogue Valley,
but instead, they are asking, as the MLC did, for a big
88
Paul Fettig, "Suit Stalks Water Diversion" Mail Tribune, 31
Jan. 2003. <http://www.mailtribune.com/archive/2003/0131/
loca l/stories/02local.htm> (22 Jan. 2006) .
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enough decrease in water diversions to keep the area
suitable for local wildlife so everyone can use it,
including, in this case, the fisheries that depend on the
salmon for their economy. 89
The Klamath controversy has yet to be resolved,
but the strategy its environmental group is using
shows that while they have the ecosystem and salmon
at heart, they have learned that such concerns are not
necessarily effective weapons in the battle against the
economic forces of a region. The environmentalists
involved in the Mono Lake dispute put together an
argument that spanned environmental and economic
concerns. The groups left no stone untumed, drawing
in people from all interest groups and walks of life,
foraging a support system that, when push came to
shove, the Los Angeles Department of Water could not
beat. Long battles are tough: the environmentalists
involved in the Mono Lake fight learned this, but such
all-consuming battles are worth it when the victory is
as important it was in Mono County.

I

89

Cat Lazaroff, "Norton Denies Petition Challenging Klamath
Water Diversions" International Daily Newswire, 16 Jul 2001,
<http:/ /ens-newswire.com/ens/jul2001/2001-07-16-06 .asp> (4
Feb. 2006).
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